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“The question here is the consistency of state action with the Federal Constitution. We have no question decided, or to be decided,
by a political branch of government coequal with this Court.”1
“To charge courts with the task of accommodating the incommensurable factors of policy that underlie these mathematical puzzles
is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to judges.” 2
I. INTRODUCTION
In his autobiography, Chief Justice Earl Warren described Baker v.
Carr3 as “the most important case of [his] tenure on the Court.”4 Following Brown v. Board of Education5 by eight years, Baker was the second
“blockbuster” case of the Warren Court.6 Warren felt that, if the progeny
of Baker had preceded Brown, Brown would have been unnecessary.7 The
Baker case would become one of “the most crucial ever taken up”8 by the
U.S. Supreme Court and “would forever change the nature of politics in
the United States.”9
Before 1960, the Supreme Court rarely had shown concern for the
electoral and legislative processes,10 instead choosing to stay out of “this
political thicket,”11 and the country had continued to suffer from problems
related to these processes. At the time of Baker, almost all state legislatures were malapportioned.12 Many state legislators refused to reapportion
their districts, and most legislatures were “backwater relics of past political deals.”13 Often lawmakers came from rural areas and frustrated the
1.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (Brennan, J., writing for the Court).
2.
Id. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
3.
See generally id. at 186.
4.
EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
5.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6.
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 199 (2000).
7.
See John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974). Ely clerked for Earl Warren.
Id. at 11.
8.
ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 379 (1997).
9.
KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS
THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 175 (1993).
10.
ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
REFORM 114 (1968).
11.
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion).
12.
Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 105 (2000). Delegations to the House of Representatives suffered from malapportionment, too. Id.
13.
Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One Vote, in
REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 219 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz
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interests of voters in the cities and suburbs, particularly with regard to
civil rights.14 By 1960, the U.S. population had become much more urban
than it had been at the beginning of the twentieth century.15 In 1900,
39.6% of people in the United States lived in urban areas, but, by 1960,
63.1% lived in urban areas.16 A 1961 University of Virginia study indicated that across the country urban voters had less than half of the representation of rural voters.17 In Florida, one of the most poorly apportioned
states, approximately nineteen percent of the population controlled the
majority in the state legislature.18 After the 1950 census, the 15,000 residents of three rural counties in Northern California had the same representation in the state senate as the 7,000,000 residents in Los Angeles County.19 To make matters worse, the drawing up of districts often involved
racial gerrymandering.20
By the 1950s, voters in Tennessee had given up appealing to the
members of their legislature for voting reform.21 With the population
growth in urban areas, rural white voters had more political say than urban black voters.22 Voters in some Tennessee counties had eight, ten, or
twenty times as much representation as voters in other counties.23 Although the Tennessee Constitution had required the legislature to draw district boundaries based on population,24 the rural legislators who held the
power had no incentive to act.25 Unfortunately for the urban voters, no
mechanism for judicial enforcement of reapportionment existed in state
court.26 In light of a “crazy quilt”27 of legislative districts, systematic in
nature,28 that was in place, some Tennessee voters eventually turned to the
federal courts, including the Supreme Court, for justice.29
With its decisions in Baker and the ensuing cases, the Supreme Court
“sent an earthquake through a political system that was already being

& Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997).
14.
Id.
15.
McConnell, supra note 12, at 104-05.
16.
U.S. Census Bureau, Table 4 - Population: 1790 to 1990 (Aug. 1993),
http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf.
17.
CRAY, supra note 8, at 380.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 381. Earl Warren eventually recognized how malapportioned his home state of California was. WARREN, supra note 4, at 309-10.
20.
CRAY, supra note 8, at 381.
21.
JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 388 (2006).
22.
Id.
23.
COX, supra note 10, at 115.
24.
McConnell, supra note 12, at 104.
25.
Id. at 105.
26.
Id. at 104.
27.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring).
28.
McConnell, supra note 12, at 105.
29.
See NEWTON, supra note 21, at 388.
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tossed and turned in so many directions”30 and began the process of putting an end to rural domination of state legislatures.31 Baker itself was a
major step down the road toward the idea of “one person, one vote,”32
which the Court would articulate for the first time a year later in Gray v.
Sanders.33 In Reynolds v. Sims, only two years after Baker, Chief Justice
Warren would observe, “Legislators represent people, not trees or
acres.”34 The resulting “reapportionment revolution”35 of Baker and its
progeny would bring attention to urban voters and their problems.36
Unlike cases such as Brown v. Board of Education37 that triggered resistance, Baker triggered a paradigm shift in reapportionment that has been
widely popular.38 The public greatly favored the decision.39 Indeed, the
30.
Nathaniel Persily, Thad Kousser & Patrick Egan, The Complicated Impact of One Person,
One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299, 1351 (2002). The
turbulent era of Baker and progeny included the assassination of President John Kennedy, the civil
rights movement, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Vietnam War, the 1968
presidential election, and other major occurrences. Id. at 1306.
31.
POWE, supra note 6, at 203.
32.
For a discussion of the meaning of this now-famous phrase, see generally Sanford Levinson,
One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269 (2002).
33.
372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (considering, in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Georgia’s county unit system of nominating officials).
34.
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (considering, in light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, malapportionment of both houses of the Alabama Legislature). For the Court’s
treatment of Georgia’s apportionment of votes for the U.S. House of Representatives, see Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), which used the command of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution that
congressional representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States.”
35.
See generally GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION,
POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966).
36.
POWE, supra note 6, at 203. In bringing attention to urban voters, the Court arguably negatively impacted local communities, both urban and rural. James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote
and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1239-43 (2002). Some political
theory helps to explain this point. Liberal theories of politics suggest that the individual enters politics
to gain the ends that he or she seeks and may join groups to achieve those ends. Id. at 1240. In contrast, communitarian and civic republican theories of politics suggest that the individual exists within a
meaningful political community and that membership within that community is part of self-identity,
rather than a means to an end. Id. at 1240-41. Liberal theories reflect a thinner view of representative
democracy than communitarian and civil republican theories. Id. at 1240. The Court’s focus on one
person, one vote after Baker, oriented more toward numbers rather than pre-existing local groups, was
more commensurate with a liberal theory of politics. See id. at 1241-43. However, given various
nationally-oriented forces in the United States such as media organizations and other business entities,
the shrinking of localism may have been inevitable. See id. at 1261-64. Regardless, simple, homogeneous communities are no longer the norm. See BAKER, supra note 35, at 102.
37.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38.
Guinier & Karlan, supra note 13, at 207. See also POWE, supra note 6, at 203; Heather K.
Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1412-13 (2002). Of course, not everyone supported the decision. Several congressmen from the South were especially critical. BAKER, supra note 35, at 7. For example, Senator
Richard B. Russell of Georgia described the decision as “‘another major assault on our constitutional
system.’” BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT – A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 426 (1983).
39.
Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of
Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1380 (1987). However, not all academics viewed the decision so
favorably. Id.
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public understood the concept of representative democracy40 and, in the
years after Baker, was eager to use, and did use, the federal courts to
challenge districting schemes.41 Recognizing the potential of Baker for
addressing the problems of urban areas, the Kennedy Administration supported the decision.42 At his first press conference after the Court announced the decision, President John Kennedy observed, “‘The right to
fair representation and to have each vote count equally is, it seems to me,
basic to the successful operation of a democracy.’”43 Attorney General
Robert Kennedy called the decision “‘a landmark in the development of
representative government.’”44
Not only was the case popular, but it was a judicial success as well.45
In the early 1960s, the legislative bodies of forty-eight states had population variances between the size of the smallest and largest districts in a
given state of over fifteen percent.46 After reapportionment and the 1970
census, merely fourteen states had this type of population variance.47 All
but three states reapportioned their legislatures, and nineteen states redrew
the lines for their congressional districts.48 Within several years of Baker
and its progeny, almost all legislative institutions in the United States had
reorganized themselves to comply with the new case law.49
Indeed, some of the work toward fairer reapportionment began soon
after Baker. Hours after the announcement of the Baker decision, attorneys filed a redistricting lawsuit in Georgia.50 Several days later, attorneys
filed a similar suit in Alabama.51 Within one year of Baker, citizens in
over thirty states challenged malapportioned districts,52 and within four
years of the case, citizens in forty-six states challenged malapportioned
districts.53
As with other major Supreme Court cases, Baker featured rhetoric
from highly influential justices, two of whom in this case were Justice
William Brennan and Justice Felix Frankfurter. Justice Brennan would
write the groundbreaking opinion for the Court that would be part of “the
40.
POWE, supra note 6, at 203.
41.
See DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.: THE
LAW AND POLITICS OF “LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY” 30 (1997).
42.
POWE, supra note 6, at 204.
43.
Id.
44.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 425.
45.
Guinier & Karlan, supra note 13, at 207; Gerken, supra note 38, at 1412.
46.
Guinier & Karlan, supra note 13, at 211.
47.
Id.
48.
Persily, Kousser & Egan, supra note 30, at 1301. Such line redrawing did not prevent those in
charge of creating districts from drawing the lines in their own favor. Id. at 1351. Partisan gerrymandering has continued to occur decennially. Id.
49.
Id. at 1301.
50.
CRAY, supra note 8, at 384.
51.
Id.
52.
Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29, 36 (1997).
53.
Persily, Kousser & Egan, supra note 30, at 1301.
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critical mass of the Brennan legacy.”54 Decades later, a noted conservative
on the Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia, would describe the progressive Brennan as “probably the most influential justice of the [twentieth]
century.”55 Justice Frankfurter would write a scathing dissent that would
defend the status quo staunchly.56 Frankfurter, a former professor at Harvard Law School, arguably “was the most qualified [Supreme Court] appointee of the [twentieth] century.”57
Although the case contained various opinions, the opinions of Brennan
and Frankfurter were particularly important, especially because of how
well they contrasted the respective judicial philosophies of their authors.
Brennan’s instrumentalist philosophy in the majority opinion looked to use
the federal courts to promote justice for urban voters, while Frankfurter’s
Holmesian philosophy in a lengthy dissent aimed to pass the problem of
fair representation along to Congress for resolution.
This Article takes a retrospective look at how the two differing judicial
philosophies of Brennan and Frankfurter, instrumentalist and Holmesian in
nature, vied to influence the outcome of Baker v. Carr, one of the most
important Supreme Court cases of the twentieth century. To do so, the
Article initially will provide an overview of four major judicial philosophies, including instrumentalism, Holmesianism, formalism, and natural
law. Consideration of all four judicial philosophies will provide for a more
thorough understanding of instrumentalism and Holmesianism. Next, the
Article will offer background on the Baker case. After offering background on the case, the Article will identify the various philosophical ingredients at work in the opinions of Brennan and Frankfurter. Finally, the
Article will make some observations regarding the judicial philosophies at
work in the two main opinions in Baker.
II. JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES
Prior legal scholarship has identified four major judicial philosophies.
Such philosophies include instrumentalism, Holmesianism, formalism, and
natural law.58 As noted above, although instrumentalism and
54.
Justice Brennan Remembered – Part 1, PBS NEWSHOUR, July 24, 1997, available at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec97/brennan_7-24.html (comments of Joshua Rosenkranz).
55.
Justice Brennan Remembered – Part 2, PBS NEWSHOUR, July 24, 1997, available at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec97/brennan_7-24a.html.
56.
Shortly after the decision in the case, Frankfurter sent a note to Justice John Marshall Harlan,
in which Frankfurter said that the Court’s majority had not “‘appreciate[d] the intrinsic and acquired
majesty of the Court’s significance in the affairs of the country.’” THE SUPREME COURT IN
CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS 851-52 n.71 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
57.
POWE, supra note 6, at 6.
58.
Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Judicial Decision-Making and Judicial Review: The
State of the Debate, Circa 2009, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 351, 352 (2010).
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Holmesianism are the two approaches that will inform the analysis in the
present Article, this section of the Article will provide an overview of all
four approaches to judicial decision-making to explain instrumentalism and
Holmesianism in contrast to the other approaches.
A. Instrumentalism
Instrumentalism is a judicial philosophy that is concerned with results.59 Instrumentalist judges see law as a means to an end.60 They believe
that law advances moral concepts and that, through their work, judges
help achieve justice.61 Such judges are willing to consider social policy,
especially when leeway in the law exists.62 For instance, no pre-existing
law may cover the specific situation at hand, ambiguities in the applicable
law may exist, or several rules of law arguably could apply in one case.63
Contrasted with Holmesian judges, instrumentalist judges are less likely to defer to other branches of government.64 Instrumentalists see the
court system as a “co-equal third branch” of the government and reject the
idea that judges only should strike down legislation that clearly violates the
Constitution.65 In assuming a role in formulating public policy, instrumentalist judges are comfortable with devising tests of their own because such
tests offer more flexibility in addressing the facts of a particular case.66
When explicitly formulating and evaluating rules of law, instrumentalists
are concerned that the rules have specific purposes, so when the purpose
for a rule is gone, the rule should no longer persist.67 Social purpose, not
pure logic, is the key.68
Instrumentalists make broadly-based historical investigations to come
to their legal conclusions.69 They look at both text and context.70 They do
not allow stare decisis to control when they feel that prior law is wrong for
the present time.71 Consequently, they see the Constitution as an evolving
document.72 On this note, Brennan observed, “For the genius of the Con59.
See R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court Is Dealing with Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 973, 980 (1996).
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to
Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 213 (1994).
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 215.
65.
See id.
66.
See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 980.
67.
See Kelso, supra note 62, at 214.
68.
See id.
69.
Id. at 216.
70.
Id.
71.
See id. at 217.
72.
Id.
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stitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is
dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with
current problems and current needs.”73
Instrumentalism was especially popular during the Warren Court era
of the 1950s and 1960s.74 Besides Brennan, instrumentalists of that era
included Chief Justice Earl Warren, as well as Justices William Douglas,
Thurgood Marshall, and Abe Fortas.75 More recently, Justice John Paul
Stevens also adopted an instrumentalist approach.76
B. Holmesianism
Named after Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Holmesianism is a judicial philosophy that favors settled law and deference to the other branches
of government.77 Holmesian judges like predictable rules and predictable
treatment of existing law.78 When the law is well-established, they generally follow precedent.79 Holmesian judges prefer rules with sharp corners to
balancing tests.80 Such judges are sensitive to the purposes behind legal
rules, including the general intent of the Framers,81 and thus are inclined
to go beyond the literal meanings of words,82 often considering history as
context for rules.83
Holmesian judges tend not to like purely mechanically-applied legal
rules.84 As Holmes himself wrote, “[A] page of history is worth a volume
of logic.”85 Decades earlier, before he was on the U.S. Supreme Court,
Holmes had observed, “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”86 To that claim, he had added, “The law embodies the story
of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”87
According to Holmesian judges, the judicial role is to interpret existing law. Any changes in the law should come from the other branches of
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
(1881).
87.

William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 7 (1985).
Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 981.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 978-79.
Id.
Id. at 984-85.
Id. at 978-79.
Id.
Kelso, supra note 62, at 196.
Id. at 198.
See id. at 195.
N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown and Company 1923)
Id.
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government.88 Most frequently, Holmesian judges caution judicial restraint.89 Consequently, Holmesian judges generally defer to the government in constitutional cases.90
Besides its use when Holmes was on the U.S. Supreme Court from
1902 until 1932,91 a Holmesian approach was popular in the years after
1937 and prior to the advent of the Warren Court in the 1950s.92 In more
recent years, Chief Justice William Rehnquist exemplified Holmesian decision-making.93
C. Formalism
Formalist judges attempt to draw a distinction between law and morality.94 The judge is not supposed to be concerned with obtaining a just
result in a given case.95 Rather, the judge is to mechanically apply legal
rules to factual circumstances.96 Although formalism adopts the position
that legal process should be free of values,97 formalism gravitates toward
values such as certainty and predictability.98
In constitutional interpretation, formalists focus on literal meanings of
words and the specific intents of Framers and Ratifiers, but not on purpose
or general intent.99 Such judges rarely place much emphasis on context,100
and they avoid broadly-based historical inquiry.101 They also shy away
from reasoned elaboration of legal concepts over time.102 Formalists prefer
“bright-line rules” to balancing tests.103
Regardless of the theoretical dissonance that doing so creates, formalists sometimes will look beyond sources contemporaneous with a rule of
law and identify a subsequent tradition.104 They will consider a consistent
legislative or executive practice as evidence of a clear tradition, and the
result is a gloss on the meaning of the text.105 Despite this theoretical ir88.
Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 979.
89.
Kelso, supra note 62, at 197.
90.
Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 979.
91.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 384 (1993).
92.
See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 980.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 977.
95.
See id.
96.
See id.
97.
See ROY L. BROOKS, STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING FROM LEGAL FORMALISM
TO CRITICAL THEORY 39 (2d ed. 2005).
98.
Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 978.
99.
Id. at 977-78.
100.
Kelso, supra note 62, at 185.
101.
See id. at 185-86.
102.
See id.
103.
See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 978.
104.
Kelso, supra note 62, at 186.
105.
Id.
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regularity, formalists do not allow an identified tradition to trump a clear
mandate in the Constitution.106
Formalism was a popular approach to judicial decision-making between 1872 and 1937.107 More recently, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas have adopted a formalist approach to their work on the
bench.108
D. Natural Law
Natural law judges draw upon strands of formalism and instrumentalism.109 Like formalist judges, natural law judges see law as a set of principles, but like instrumentalist judges, natural law judges apply moral concepts to legal decision-making.110 Indeed, natural law judges elaborate on
the moral concepts in the Constitution.111 Such judges follow a social contract as established in the Constitution.112
Purpose is important to natural law judges.113 Context and history are
also important.114 Natural law judges respect reasoned elaboration of legal
precedents as well as legislative and executive practices as glosses on textual meanings.115
A natural law approach to decision-making was popular in the United
States from 1789 until 1872.116 Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice
Joseph Story exemplified an early natural law perspective.117 In more recent years, Justices Sandra O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy have revived
the natural law perspective. 118
III. BACKGROUND ON BAKER V. CARR
The factual background that the justices on the Supreme Court encountered in Baker constituted “a classic lockout scenario.”119 Charles W.
Baker and nine other plaintiffs, all of whom were Tennessee residents who
lived in Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, claimed that,
106.
Id.
107.
See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 978.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 982.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Kelso, supra note 62, at 150-52.
114.
Id. at 153-54.
115.
Id. at 157-58.
116.
See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 983.
117.
Kelso, supra note 62, at 152.
118.
Kelso & Kelso, supra note 59, at 983.
119.
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, “Fair Representation”
and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 556 (2003).
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because of a population shift and the lack of legislative reapportionment
since 1901, the plaintiffs were suffering from dilution of their votes for the
Tennessee Legislature.120 In 1901, the state’s population had been
2,020,616 with 487,380 individuals eligible to vote.121 In 1960, the state’s
population was 3,567,089 with 2,092,891 individuals eligible to vote.122
Between 1901 and 1960, the relative standings of the counties with regard
to individuals qualified to vote had changed substantially too.123 At the
time of Baker, forty percent of the voters elected sixty of ninety-nine
members of the Tennessee House, while thirty-seven percent of the voters
elected twenty of thirty-three members of the Tennessee Senate.124 The
mayor of Nashville had commented that “‘the hog lot and the cow pasture’” governed the state.125 The Plaintiffs sued Tennessee Secretary of
State Joseph Carr and other state officials in federal court under Sections
1983 and 1988 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, claiming that Tennessee’s
1901 Apportionment Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.126
The federal district court dismissed the case on the grounds of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.127 The lower court believed that the Supreme Court’s
then-recent case of Colegrove v. Green128 was controlling precedent in the
current case.129 Frankfurter had written the plurality opinion in
Colegrove.130
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the Baker case. The Court’s
agreeing to hear the case after having rejected a prior challenge to the
same malapportioned Tennessee Legislature in 1956 was ironic. In a per
curiam opinion in Kidd v. McCanless,131 which had come from the Tennessee Supreme Court,132 the U.S. Supreme Court had cited Colegrove as
grounds for dismissal.133
On April 19 and 20, 1961, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in
the new Tennessee case.134 At the conference that followed oral argument,
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices Hugo Black, William Douglas, and
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 192-94; CRAY, supra note 8, at 379; POWE, supra note 6, at 200.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 192.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 253 (Clark, J., concurring).
CRAY, supra note 8, at 379.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 187-88, 192, 205.
Id. at 196.
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 410.
Id.
See generally 352 U.S. 920 (1956) (per curiam).
See generally Kidd v. McCanless, 292 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. 1956).
See Kidd, 352 U.S. at 920.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
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William Brennan all agreed that federal jurisdiction was appropriate and
that a cause of action existed.135 Frankfurter strongly opposed these justices, unleashing “‘a brilliant tour de force . . . speaking at considerable
length, pulling down reports and reading from them, and powerfully arguing the correctness of Colegrove,’” as Brennan later recalled.136 Frankfurter’s performance, in which he presented a parade of horribles that would
ensue if the Court entered the apportionment arena,137 lasted between oneand-a-half and two hours.138 Both Justices Tom Clark and John Marshall
Harlan agreed with Frankfurter.139 Since he thought that a bare majority
was insufficient to abandon Colegrove, Justice Charles Whittaker would
vote with Frankfurter.140 Justice Potter Stewart, the key fifth vote for a
Warren group majority, was critical of the Colegrove precedent, but he
did not think the plaintiffs could successfully make a claim on the merits
for equal protection.141 Because Stewart could not make up his mind, the
case was put off for reargument until the next term.142
Reargument took place on October 9, 1961.143 During the second
round of oral argument, Warren asked Tennessee Assistant Attorney General Jack Wilson whether the plaintiffs had a remedy for their problem in
the courts of Tennessee.144 Wilson answered that the plaintiffs did not have
any remedy at all in state court.145 This candid response caught the attention of Stewart.146
Almost immediately after the reargument, Frankfurter circulated a
memorandum among the Brethren, arguing for his position against taking
the case.147 This memorandum, sixty pages in length, was almost the same
as the dissenting opinion that he would publish.148 Brennan responded by
circulating his own memorandum with an attached chart that illustrated the
problem of vote dilution among different counties in Tennessee.149
At the conference that followed reargument, Stewart made known his
intent to vote with the Warren group.150 Although worried about federal
court intervention in the area of apportionment,151 Stewart had become
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 412.
CRAY, supra note 8, at 381.
Lewis, supra note 52, at 31.
Id. at 30; EISLER, supra note 9, at 171.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 412.
Id.
See Lewis, supra note 52, at 31.
POWE, supra note 6, at 201.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
CRAY, supra note 8, at 381.
Id. at 382.
Id.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 413.
Lewis, supra note 52, at 31.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 413-14.
Id. at 415.
CRAY, supra note 8, at 382.
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concerned that the Tennessee malapportionment was so extreme as to be
irrational, and he felt that federal district court jurisdiction was appropriate.152 However, Stewart would agree to support jurisdiction only; he did
not want to address the merits of the case.153 Warren now had the five
votes necessary for an opinion that jurisdiction was appropriate.
When it came time to write the Court’s opinion, Warren, having previously contemplated writing the opinion himself, consulted Black and
Douglas and then assigned the opinion to Brennan.154 The decision to assign the opinion to Brennan had taken Warren ten days to make after the
conference that followed reargument.155 The assignment was somewhat
ironic because, in the early 1960s, Brennan, one of the three newest justices on the Court, was still relatively unknown.156 Nonetheless, Brennan,
“a judicial craftsman,”157 had the best chance of retaining Stewart’s
vote.158 Brennan had his work cut out for him. Not only did Brennan have
the task of writing an opinion that would keep together a majority of the
Court,159 but he also had to write an opinion that would withstand the rhetorical assault of an incensed Frankfurter, Brennan’s former law professor.160 By the time the Court heard Baker, Frankfurter was no longer able
to agree with his opponents at all.161
During late 1961 and early 1962, Brennan circulated various drafts of
an opinion, attempting to please both Stewart, who wanted a narrow opinion, and Douglas, who wanted a sweeping opinion.162 In January 1962,
Stewart indicated that he would sign Brennan’s opinion.163 In preparing to
write a dissent, Clark mysteriously wanted to consult Brennan’s
malapportionment chart again.164 When Clark realized that the voters of
Tennessee had no other recourse for their problem besides the federal

152.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 417.
153.
See id. at 417-18.
154.
NEWTON, supra note 21, at 390; CRAY, supra note 8, at 382.
155.
Lewis, supra note 52, at 32.
156.
See EISLER, supra note 9, at 12-13.
157.
CRAY, supra note 8, at 382.
158.
POWE, supra note 6, at 499.
159.
Brennan joked that a key talent for a member of the Court was an ability to count to five.
Lewis, supra note 52, at 32.
160.
NEWTON, supra note 21, at 390. Frankfurter had an over-blown self-image that was vital to
his sense of well-being. H. N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 5 (1981). The justice
could not accept opposition in areas in which he felt he had expertise, and he responded to such opposition with hostility. Id. at 5-6. When Stewart eventually sided with Brennan, Frankfurter told his law
clerks, “‘This is the darkest day in the history of the Court.’” CRAY, supra note 8, at 382.
161.
HIRSCH, supra note 160, at 198. By 1962, Frankfurter, then “old and ill,” was more interested
in his legacy. Id.
162.
NEWTON, supra note 21, at 390.
163.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 419.
164.
Lewis, supra note 52, at 34-35.
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courts, he changed his mind, siding with the Warren group on both jurisdiction and the merits.165
After Clark switched his vote to join Brennan, Brennan had five votes
for both reversal on jurisdiction and a decision on the merits.166 However,
Warren wanted to respect Stewart’s wishes against a decision on the merits, and Brennan wanted to keep his promise to Stewart regarding a narrow
opinion.167 In the end, Brennan would limit the decision to jurisdiction.168
On March 26, 1962, Brennan issued an opinion for the Court that six
justices signed.169 The Supreme Court held that the lower court’s dismissal
was in error and remanded the case to the lower court for purposes of
trial.170 Douglas, Clark, and Stewart issued concurring opinions;171 Frankfurter and Harlan issued dissents.172 Frankfurter was especially upset.173
Given his poor health,174 Whittaker ultimately did not vote in the case.175
With their six opinions, the participating justices produced 165 pages of
rhetoric for the reporters.176
As the opinions of the day were read from the bench, Warren, no
doubt quite pleased that his group had held together a majority, wrote a
note to Brennan that said, “‘It is a great day for the Irish.’”177 Then, before passing along the note, Warren replaced the word Irish with the word
country.178
IV. JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES AT WORK IN THE OPINIONS OF BRENNAN
AND FRANKFURTER
This section of the Article looks at how judicial philosophies played
out in Brennan’s opinion for the Court and Frankfurter’s dissent. The section will illustrate Brennan’s instrumentalist approach and Frankfurter’s
Holmesian approach.
165.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 422-23.
166.
Id. at 419.
167.
Id.; EISLER, supra note 9, at 175.
168.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 418-19.
169.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 186-87.
170.
Id. at 188.
171.
See id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring), 251 (Clark, J., concurring), 265 (Stewart, J., concurring).
172.
See id. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 330 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Law clerks wrote
some of Frankfurter’s well-known opinions almost in their entirety. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 61.
In Baker, law clerk Anthony G. Amsterdam had written what became Frankfurter’s dissent.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 413.
173.
NEWTON, supra note 21, at 391-92.
174.
See id. at 392. Frankfurter’s constant pressuring of Whittaker to prevent him from changing
his vote contributed to Whittaker’s stress and health problems. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 427-28.
Whittaker retired from the Court on April 1, 1962. Id.
175.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
176.
BAKER, supra note 35, at 122.
177.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 424.
178.
Id.
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A. Brennan’s Opinion As Instrumentalist
Brennan’s opinion demonstrated a strong instrumentalist approach to
decision-making. Because the author of an opinion for the Court must
maintain a majority, an opinion for the Court is often not as pure a statement of the author’s philosophy as is a concurrence or dissent, but Brennan’s opinion in Baker still made a clear instrumentalist statement. In his
opinion, Brennan treated law as a means to an end, used law to advance
moral concepts, employed the court system to help achieve justice, refrained from deferring to other branches of the government, adopted a
judicially-created test, and saw the Constitution as an evolving document.
This subsection elaborates on the various instrumentalist ingredients in
Brennan’s opinion.
First, Brennan’s opinion viewed law as a means to an end, and the end
was promoting equal voting rights for urban voters. Brennan used various
legal doctrines to further the end that he and the majority desired. For
instance, he determined that, under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, the federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the representation controversy.179 The matter had “‘arise[n] under’” the Constitution
because the matter involved an alleged violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.180 Therefore, Congress could give
the district courts subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Article III, and
Congress did so in Section 1343(3) of Title 28 of the U.S. Code.181
Additionally, Brennan found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring
their lawsuit.182 He determined that the plaintiffs had sued to vindicate
their interest regarding an ability to vote and that they had sued the appropriate officials, including the Tennessee Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, the Coordinator of Elections, and members of the State Board of
Elections, who allegedly could be held responsible for the vote dilution.183
The plaintiffs were “asserting ‘a plain, direct and adequate interest in
maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.’”184
Furthermore, Brennan worked with precedent in addressing the potential problem of the political question doctrine.185 He argued that Colegrove

179.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 199.
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 200.
182.
Id. at 206.
183.
See id. at 205-08.
184.
Id. at 208 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)).
185.
The term political question is a misnomer because the federal courts address matters related to
politics. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 131 (4th ed.
2011). See generally, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (determining that President
Richard Nixon had to comply with a subpoena for tapes of presidential conversations sought as evidence in a criminal trial).
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v. Green,186 a key precedent for the argument in favor of the political
question bar to allowing a federal court to hear the case, had been misinterpreted by the district court because the current case was about the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Guarantee Clause in Article IV.187 Brennan noted that the political question doctrine was applicable in cases that involved
the relationships that the federal courts had with other branches of the federal government, not with the states.188 To explain how the current case
failed to fit into the political question doctrine, the justice composed a list
of cases where the political question doctrine would pose a problem, including cases that involved foreign relations, dates of duration of hostilities, validity of constitutional amendments, the status of Indian tribes, and
a republican form of government.189 Because of Frankfurter’s dissent,
Brennan focused on the republication form of government argument. He
distinguished Luther v. Borden,190 which had grown out of the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island in the 1840s, from the current case, noting that Luther had been about which government was lawful, not about vote dilution
as Baker was.191
In both affirmative and negative ways, Brennan employed various legal doctrines, including those related to subject matter jurisdiction, standing, and political questions, to achieve the end of allowing the plaintiffs to
make their case in federal court for vote dilution. Thus, Brennan used the
law as a means to further an end.
Second, Brennan called upon the law to promote the moral concept of
equality in voting. In Baker, urban voters suffered from vote dilution as
more people had moved to the cities in the six decades since the Tennessee
Legislature last had reapportioned the state.192 For example, 2,340 citizens
in Moore County had one state house member, while 55,712 citizens in
Sullivan County had one state house member.193 Shelby County’s multimember delegation had one member for every 39,043 voters, while Gibson County’s multi-member delegation had one member for every 14,916
voters.194 Although Brennan acknowledged that, if the case were about a
republican form of government, the Guarantee Clause would not help the
186.
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
187.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 209-10. Brennan’s movement from the Guarantee Clause to the Equal
Protection Clause has been described as an attempt to avoid the appearance of the Court’s departure
from precedents on nonjusticiability. McConnell, supra note 12, at 106-07. However, this criticism
itself has received criticism as being unrealistic given the composition of the Court at the time. See
Roy A. Schotland, The Limits of Being “Present at the Creation,” 80 N.C. L. REV. 1505, 1508-10
(2002).
188.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
189.
Id. at 210-19.
190.
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
191.
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 223.
192.
Guinier & Karlan, supra note 13, at 208.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
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plaintiffs,195 he instead focused on vote dilution and called upon the Equal
Protection Clause to conclude that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to make their case in federal court for equality in voting.196
Either implicitly or explicitly, Brennan’s opinion provided for several
types of political equality.197 The opinion assumed equal suffrage, which is
that everyone would be able to vote.198 While this was not always true in
the South at the time of Baker,199 Brennan supported the concept as an
assumption of his main argument. The opinion also provided for equal
probabilities, which means that, at a theoretical level, each vote would be
equally likely to shape the results of a given election.200 The focus of the
opinion was on equal shares, a concept that states that each elected official
should represent an equal number of voters as another politician.201 This
focus was the forerunner of the idea of one person, one vote.
Third, Brennan’s opinion demonstrated how the federal courts could
help achieve justice regarding equal voting rights. Brennan deftly avoided
allowing the political question doctrine to prevent the plaintiffs from
bringing their suit in federal court and instead saw the constitutional deprivation as amenable to judicial correction.202 Brennan drew upon the
Court’s then-recent opinion in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.203 In Gomillion, the
black plaintiff had lived in Tuskegee, Alabama, until the state legislature
had redrawn the city boundaries to exclude most of the black residents.204
The plaintiff had maintained that this government action had denied him
his right to vote in city elections.205 Noting that the state could not act by
“‘circumventing a federally protected right,’”206 the Supreme Court had
held that the state action violated the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
the right to vote.207
Rather than letting the state legislature discriminate against members
of a racial minority group, the Court in Gomillion had situated the state
action within the reach of the U.S. Constitution and, accordingly, within
the reach of the federal courts.208 Calling upon this Gomillion precedent in
195.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 223.
196.
Id. at 237.
197.
For several types of political equality for which the opinion did not provide, see Guinier &
Karlan, supra note 13, at 217-18.
198.
Id.
199.
Id. at 218.
200.
See id. at 217-18.
201.
See id.
202.
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 229.
203.
364 U.S. 339 (1960). Frankfurter had authored the Court’s opinion in Gomillion. Id. at 340.
Brennan’s use of Frankfurter’s Gomillion opinion to help make the argument against Frankfurter’s
Baker dissent was ironic.
204.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 229-30.
205.
Id. at 230.
206.
Id. at 231 (quoting Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347).
207.
Id. at 229.
208.
See id. at 230.
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Baker, Brennan constructed a similar voting rights case based on the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Fifteenth Amendment, thereby opening
the door to the prospect of justice for the plaintiffs at the district court
level following remand of the case.
Fourth, Brennan’s opinion reflected a lack of inclination to defer to
other branches of the federal government. Brennan could have argued, as
Frankfurter did, that the matter of apportionment was a political question
and that, under the Guarantee Clause, the matter would have been one for
Congress to address. Well aware of the argument for the political question
roadblock, Brennan instead drew a distinction between political questions
and political cases.209 Brennan noted, “The courts cannot reject as ‘no law
suit’ a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”210 Touching upon matters related
to the organization of state government would not turn a matter into a political question,211 just a matter political in nature.
Brennan distinguished Luther v. Borden212 from the case at bar so the
Court would not have to defer to another branch of the federal system.
Reviewing Chief Justice Roger Taney’s Luther opinion, which had dealt
with a republican form of government for Rhode Island, Brennan observed
that Taney had listed several factors that had established a political question in Luther.213 The factors had included a commitment to other branches
of the decision regarding the lawful government of a state, clear presidential action in recognizing a government, a need for finality in the President’s decision, and a lack of criteria a court could use to determine which
type of government was republican.214 Since the factors from Luther did
not cover the matter of diluted voting rights in Baker, the Baker matter
was outside the area that the federal courts were prohibited from entering.
The Court did not have to defer to Congress or the President, and Brennan
was pleased to remand the matter to the federal district court for further
proceedings.
Fifth, Brennan adopted a judicially-created test that gave the federal
courts a great deal of flexibility in assessing whether a case presented a
political question that would bar federal judicial process in that case.
Brennan indicated that “[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question” would be the following:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 217.
Id.
See id. at 218.
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 218, 222.
Id. at 222.
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without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.215
In the absence of factual satisfaction of at least one of these factors,
the Court should refrain from dismissing a case on political question
grounds.216 As noted above, Brennan found factual support for none of the
factors he listed.217
The political question factors presented anything but the sharpcornered rules that a Holmesian justice would appreciate.218 For instance,
“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”219 was problematic because the power of
judicial review allows courts to review most actions of other branches, and
the Constitution, which does not even reference judicial review, accordingly fails to list exceptions to the federal courts’ power of judicial review.220 The matter of what constituted “judicially discoverable and manageable standards”221 was open to a fair amount of interpretation. In constitutional cases, the Court has created a variety of standards to interpret
nebulous constitutional provisions.222 Indeed, in the apportionment cases
that followed Baker, the Equal Protection Clause itself, absent judicial
contribution, offered no standards for evaluating state apportionment
laws.223 One could make the same vagueness point about whether another
branch of government should make an initial policy determination.
The other factors were not any clearer. With regard to whether a court
might fail to express respect due to another branch of government, the
federal courts implicitly show disrespect for the other branches of government when the courts strike down legislative and executive actions as
215.
Id. at 217.
216.
Id.
217.
See id. at 226.
218.
See C HEMERINSKY , supra note 185, at 132-33 (describing the Baker political question doctrine factors as “useless”). See also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question
Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1184
(2002) (describing Baker as “delphic and protean”).
219.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
220.
Pushaw, supra note 218, at 1176-77.
221.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
222.
See C HEMERINSKY , supra note 185, at 551-54; Pushaw, supra note 218, at 1176.
223.
Pushaw, supra note 218, at 1176. In Baker, Brennan avoided providing a specific equal protection standard. BAKER, supra note 35, at 8. Nonetheless, Brennan did note the following: “Judicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to
courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they
must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.” Baker, 369
U.S. at 226.
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unconstitutional, 224 yet judicial review remains a commonly accepted
power. One might ask when the courts should refrain from questioning a
political decision. Also, when a court declares the action of another branch
of government unconstitutional, then two branches of government have
made different, and thus conflicting, pronouncements on an issue,225 but,
with judicial review, this phenomenon is well-established. Brennan did not
clarify these factors. In laying them out, he gave the federal courts a great
deal of room for maneuvering in the realm of political questions.226 In that
way, judges’ understandings of the facts and social policies, not of the
rules, would drive the analyses in future cases.
These factors were so flexible, in part, because they did not draw upon one consistent theoretical perspective; rather they drew upon at least
three such theoretical perspectives.227 One such perspective is the classical
theory of political questions, which, as John Marshall articulated in Marbury v. Madison,228 states that a federal court can decide all matters before
it except those that the Constitution specifically gives to another branch of
the government to address.229 Another perspective is the prudential theory
of political questions, which says that a court should avoid deciding the
merits of a case when doing so would put the court in a position to compromise an important principle or undermine the credibility of the court.230
An additional perspective is the functional theory, which looks at considerations such as a court’s gaining access to relevant information, the need
for uniformity of decision in an international matter, and the various responsibilities of other branches of the government.231
Each of the six factors that Brennan presented reflected a theory of the
political question doctrine. The first factor, “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,”232 reflected the classical theory.233 The second two factors, “a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the
question]” and “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy de-

224.
Pushaw, supra note 218, at 1175-76.
225.
See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97,
163 n.250 (1988).
226.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 107 (2d ed. 1988). See also
Pushaw, supra note 218, at 1181-83.
227.
TRIBE, supra note 226, at 96.
228.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
229.
TRIBE, supra note 226, at 96; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1959).
230.
TRIBE, supra note 226, at 96; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 23-28, 184 (1962).
231.
Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517, 566-83 (1966).
232.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
233.
TRIBE, supra note 226, at 96 n.6.
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termination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,”234 reflected the
functional theory.235 The final three factors, “the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government,” “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,” and “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question,”236 reflected the prudential theory.237 By drawing upon at least three theories of the political question doctrine, Brennan’s Baker opinion embodied the flexibility that instrumentalist judges
desire and provided such flexibility for judges who would be hearing apportionment cases on the merits in the near future.
Sixth, Brennan worked with an evolving Constitution that met the
needs of the day. Although Brennan did not admit it,238 specifically to keep
the Court’s majority together,239 he revised the Court’s understanding of
Colegrove v. Green,240 the then-recent precedent on apportionment that
was lingering in the background in Baker.241 In Colegrove, several Illinois
voters had challenged the apportionment of Illinois congressional districts.242 The Supreme Court had upheld the district court’s dismissal of
the case.243 While the Court had not had a majority opinion,244 the implication of the result had been that the Constitution did not allow for this type
of suit in federal court. The other justices who wrote opinions in Baker
noted Brennan’s rhetorical move. In his concurring opinion in the case,
Douglas commented that the Court had held in Colegrove that the protection of voting rights was beyond the attention of the federal judiciary.245 In
his Baker dissent, Frankfurter explained that the Court’s series of cases
that included Colegrove had been “overruled or disregarded” with the
234.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
235.
TRIBE, supra note 226, at 97 n.6.
236.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
237.
TRIBE, supra note 226, at 96-97 n.6.
238.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-10.
239.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 419. See also NEWTON, supra note 21, at 390. Stewart had
wanted a narrow opinion. Id. In his concurrence, Stewart wrote “to emphasize in a few words what
the opinion does and does not say.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring). He observed,
“The Court today decides three things and no more: ‘(a) that the [trial] court possessed jurisdiction of
the subject matter; (b) that a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief; and (c) . . . that the appellants have standing to challenge the Tennessee
apportionment statutes.’” Id. In contrast, in his concurrence, Douglas claimed that many of the prior
political question doctrine cases that the Court had decided were wrong. Id. at 241 n.1 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
240.
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
241.
See Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of “Judicially Unmanageable” Standards in Election
Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1475 (2002) (explaining that Brennan “essentially overruled Colegrove”).
242.
Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 550.
243.
Id. at 556.
244.
Id. at 550.
245.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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majority opinion in Baker.246 Still, Brennan diplomatically moved from a
Colegrove-esque understanding of whether the Constitution afforded citizens whose votes were diluted an opportunity to be heard in federal court
to a Gomillion-esque understanding of that problem. Since Colegrove as
previously understood did not work, Brennan reshaped the Court’s understanding of a federal constitutional right.
Although tempered to maintain a Court, Brennan’s instrumentalist judicial philosophy was at work in the Court’s majority opinion in Baker.
Brennan treated law as a means to an end, used law to advance moral concepts, employed the court system to help achieve justice, refrained from
deferring to other branches of the government, adopted a judicially-created
test, and saw the Constitution as an evolving document. This type of judicial philosophy helped to open the door to fairer representation in government.
B. Frankfurter’s Opinion As Holmesian
In contrast to Brennan’s instrumentalist opinion, which Frankfurter
described as “empty rhetoric,”247 Frankfurter’s opinion demonstrated a
strong Holmesian philosophical approach. Indeed, Holmes himself had
been a mentor to Frankfurter.248 In his opinion, Frankfurter called upon
predictable rules and precedent, emphasized the need for rules with sharp
corners, looked at the purpose behind the law, expressed his belief in the
limited role of the judiciary, and wanted to defer to another branch of the
government. This subsection elaborates on the various ingredients in
Frankfurter’s Holmesian opinion.
First, Frankfurter called upon predictable rules and precedent to make
his case. Committed to a case whose plurality opinion he had authored,
Frankfurter looked to Colegrove v. Green249 for precedent. As noted
above, Colegrove was the recent Supreme Court case in which Illinois
voters had challenged the apportionment of their congressional districts,
and the Supreme Court had upheld the district court’s dismissal of the

246.
Id. at 277 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
247.
Id. at 270. Frankfurter’s use of this term reflects the fact that, at times, rhetoric has been a
marginalized discursive genre. Throughout Western history, rhetoric has existed “within a dialectic of
authority and marginality.” Robert Hariman, Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory, 72 Q. J.
SPEECH 38, 51 (1986). Rhetoric’s having held a place of marginality is in part due to Plato’s critique
of the Sophists and their use of rhetoric, which he described as “cookery.” Id. at 39. Indeed, Plato
provided the first association of rhetoric with deceit and flattery. GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL
RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 66 (2d
ed. 1999). Despite Plato’s critique of rhetoric, “[r]hetoric was the superior art in ancient Rome and
throughout the Renaissance.” Hariman, supra, at 41.
248.
HIRSCH, supra note 160, at 10. Frankfurter later picked law clerks for Holmes. POWE, supra
note 6, at 6.
249.
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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case, 250 which implied that the Constitution did not allow for this type of
suit in federal court. As Frankfurter saw it, “Colegrove held that a federal
court should not entertain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to
adjudicate the constitutionality, under the Equal Protection Clause and
other federal constitutional and statutory provisions, of a state statute establishing the respective districts for the State’s election of Representatives
to the Congress.”251 In Colegrove, Frankfurter had described the problematic area to be judicially avoided as a “political thicket.”252 The dissenting
justice in Baker believed that the two opinions by the four justices who
comprised a majority of the seven members of the Court who participated
in Colegrove were sufficient to establish this legal principle.253 In a series
of cases since Colegrove, the Supreme Court had heeded the considerations behind the political question doctrine.254
Additionally, Frankfurter offered his historical understanding as precedent for the idea that representation was not necessarily proportionate to
the geographic spread of the population.255 He looked to the past of Great
Britain,256 where, until the nineteenth century, the base of representation
was the county or borough, from which a set number of representatives
would be selected, regardless of the population.257 Before the Reform Act
of 1832, citizens in well-populated northern industrial centers had been
largely disenfranchised.258 By the 1870s and 1880s, one-quarter of the
electorate had two-thirds of the members of the House of Commons.259
Although Parliament made various attempts to distribute its seats by population, the problem persisted.260 Frankfurter noted that English judges long
had been reluctant to become involved in disputes over political power.261
In the British colonies that later became the United States, a similar
system of representation based on local government entities such as towns
or counties developed, even though the British experience “was a model to
be avoided.”262 “[G]rossly unequal electoral units” were the result.263
250.
Id. at 550, 556.
251.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 277 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
252.
328 U.S. at 556 (plurality opinion).
253.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 277-78 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
254.
Id. at 278.
255.
See id. at 301.
256.
In England and later Great Britain, because the Parliament had its origins in a non-democratic
medieval society, the idea of political equality took a long time to develop. BAKER, supra note 35, at
15.
257.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The borough that retained its level of
representation despite reduced population and importance was a “rotten borough.” BAKER, supra note
35, at 15-16.
258.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
259.
Id. at 304.
260.
See id. at 304-07.
261.
Id. at 288 n.21.
262.
Id. at 307.
263.
Id.
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Since the Constitution did not apportion based on population, the problem
persisted after the Constitutional Convention.264 Frankfurter noted that, at
a state level, the problem of disproportionate representation persisted up
until and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.265
For good measure, Frankfurter looked at apportionment contemporaneous with Baker. He observed that only twelve state constitutions provided for periodic apportionment of both legislative houses, and only about
another twelve state constitutions called for such reapportionment of one
house.266 In many cases, legislatures had not reapportioned, despite state
constitutional requirements to do so.267
In sum, Frankfurter argued that consistent and longstanding precedent
existed for non-proportional representation. As he understood the situation, the case was about “a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a
different label,”268 and precedent did not allow for judicial relief.269 Frankfurter described a problem, but he was unwilling to address it via the federal courts.
In believing that precedent offered a predictable rule contrary to the
rule the Court adopted, Frankfurter was not restrained in his assessment of
the Court’s rhetoric. He described the Court’s shift as “a massive repudiation of the experience of our whole past.”270 By straying from wellestablished precedent, the Court was “asserting destructively novel judicial
power.”271
Second, if the federal courts were to address the case, which Frankfurter did not support, the dissenting justice expressed a need for rules with
sharp corners. He noted the difficulty of creating judicial standards for
addressing reapportionment,272 particularly under the Guarantee Clause.273
The problem, he argued, was complex and beyond judicial capacity to
handle; the courts lacked the expertise to work with such a problem.274
Indeed, “[t]he dominant consideration [was] ‘the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination.’”275 This was especially so when the apportionment issue was the main issue for a federal court to hear in a
case.276
264.
Id. at 308.
265.
See id. at 310-18.
266.
Id. at 319.
267.
See id. at 320.
268.
Id. at 297.
269.
Frankfurter lost the Guarantee Clause argument, but he was not the last person to make a
Guarantee Clause argument related to apportionment. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 12, at 113-16.
270.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
271.
Id.
272.
Id. at 277-78.
273.
See id. at 289.
274.
See id. at 282.
275.
Id. at 283 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)).
276.
Id. at 282.
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Frankfurter added that adopting the Equal Protection Clause as a
standard instead of the Guarantee Clause would not help to address the
problem of judicial standards.277 If reasonableness under the Equal Protection Clause were a function of the type of government allowed, then the
Court would have to determine what constituted a republican form of government before determining the issue of equal protection.278 Accordingly,
in the absence of a clear standard for the courts to apply, the Court should
not allow the plaintiffs to proceed with their case.
Despite what Frankfurter wrote, various standards did or soon would
exist. Options for standards under the Equal Protection Clause included
substantial equality and absolute equality.279 If it had been created slightly
earlier, the soon-to-be-famous one person, one vote standard would have
been an option.280 Also, after Baker and before the Court decided the factually similar case of Reynolds v. Sims281 two years later, the lower federal
courts effectively devised and applied their own standards in apportionment cases.282 Focusing his analysis exclusively on the Equal Protection
Clause regardless of the type of government involved, Frankfurter could
have adopted or devised one standard or another, but he opted not to do
so.283 The standards were or could have been available, although, besides
absolute equality, the standards were not rules with sharp corners.
Third, Frankfurter examined the purpose behind one of the key matters at issue in the case. Standing persistently beside the idea that the
courts should not consider reapportionment cases, Frankfurter pointed out
that the Framers refused to allow the federal judiciary to remedy every
social problem.284 Other branches had roles to play in government, too.
Frankfurter observed, “To charge courts with the task of accommodating
the incommensurable factors of policy that underlie these mathematical
puzzles is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to judges.”285 Shuddering at the thought of such judicial “omnicompetence,”
Frankfurter then explained that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution persis277.
Id. at 300-01.
278.
Id. at 301.
279.
See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on
the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1124 (2002).
280.
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 120-21
(1980).
281.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
282.
See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting
Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1360, 1408 (2002).
283.
If one thinks less about the existence of standards and more about how the Court could choose
among those existing standards, and also if one accepts Frankfurter’s concern with judicial policymaking, then Frankfurter’s claim could make more sense. See Charles, supra note 279, at 1124-26. Still,
in adopting standards, the Court has chosen among various options, such as the different levels of
scrutiny in equal protection cases. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 185, at 551-54.
284.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 269-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
285.
Id. at 268.
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tently rejected a proposal that embodied this assumption and Thomas Jefferson never entertained it.”286 Because of their limited role in government, as Frankfurter understood it, the courts were not the forum for addressing the reapportionment problem.287
Fourth, and on a related note, Frankfurter insisted that the role of the
judiciary was merely to interpret existing law. Quoting Chief Justice
Taney in Luther v. Borden,288 Frankfurter commented, “‘It is the province
of a court to expound the law, not to make it.’”289 The dissenting justice
did not want the judiciary to enter a new area of law and develop new
principles. In moving into an area where the Court was breaking new
ground, the Court showed its “[d]isregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court’s ‘judicial Power’”290 Frankfurter expressed his
concern regarding the Court’s authority.291 Such authority was a function
of “sustained public confidence in [the Court’s] moral sanction.”292 If the
Court began to make law, as Frankfurter understood the situation, the
Court would suffer the consequence of reduced public confidence. In dramatic fashion, Frankfurter scolded the Court for its action as follows: “It
implies a sorry confession of judicial impotence in place of a frank acknowledgment that there is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy
for every political mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative
power.”293 The Court, Frankfurter maintained, had overextended itself.294
Fifth, Frankfurter emphasized the importance of judicial deference to
the government in cases of political questions. From past case law, he
devised a list of matters that would constitute political questions, including
the following: war and foreign affairs; the structure and organization of
institutions of the states; and abstract questions regarding political power,
sovereignty, or government.295 Of note, Frankfurter admitted that the
Court could act in cases of black disenfranchisement because of the specific constitutional mandates in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment.296
With this list of political questions in mind, Frankfurter observed that
Congress should decide the matter of what government was appropriate
for a state.297 The authority for this principle was the Guarantee Clause.298
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Id. at 267.
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 295 (quoting Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 41).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 269-70.
See id. at 269.
Id. at 280-88.
Id. at 285-86.
Id. at 294.
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“The crux of the matter,” Frankfurter maintained, “is that courts are not
fit instruments of decision where what is essentially at stake is the composition of those large contests of policy traditionally fought out in nonjudicial forums . . . .”299 If the plaintiffs were to be heard on the merits,
then Congress would have to decide the matter.
Frankfurter’s Holmesian judicial philosophy was at work throughout
an acerbic dissent in Baker. Frankfurter called upon predictable rules and
precedent, emphasized the need for rules with sharp corners, looked at the
purpose behind the law, expressed his belief in the limited role of the judiciary, and would have deferred to another branch of the government. This
type of philosophy would have avoided judicial action to remedy the obvious problem of malapportionment.
V. OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES AT WORK IN
THE OPINIONS OF BRENNAN AND FRANKFURTER
Overall, the judicial philosophies at work in the Baker opinions examined here brought several matters to light. For instance, the philosophies
illustrated the ongoing legal dialectic of change versus tradition. In Baker,
Brennan saw the very real problem of disproportionate representation and
used the federal courts to open the door to a legal remedy for that problem. Instrumentalism was a tool for social improvement. In contrast,
Frankfurter looked to the past for guidance on how, if at all, to address the
problem, and, based on tradition, passionately insisted that the courts refrain from taking action to remedy the problem. Holmesianism was a tool
for the status quo. In a system based on precedent, tradition will always
play a role, but sometimes society needs to move forward.
On a related note, the philosophies in the opinions dramatized another
legal dialectic, that of activity versus passivity, particularly with regard to
the role of courts in the United States.300 As both Brennan for the Court
and Frankfurter in dissent agreed, some questions are “political” in the
sense that other branches of government should address them; courts do
not remedy all wrongs.301 Still, in conversation with the passive virtues302
298.
Id.
299.
Id. at 287.
300.
See COX, supra note 10, at 115.
301.
See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 624-25
(1976).
302.
See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term – Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). Passive virtues are avoidance techniques. See Gerald Gunther,
The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues” – A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1964). Courts do not always have to decide cases. BICKEL, supra note
230, at 200-01. However, passive virtues do not necessarily produce completely passive results. For
example, passive virtues might lead to a judicial decision that avoids reaching a result via constitutional analysis. See id. at 207. With passive virtues, the focus is on the exercise of less judicial power. See
id.
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of Holmesianism are the active virtues303 of instrumentalism. As Alexander Hamilton noted, courts are supposed to be “the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments.”304 Hamilton added that the
judiciary is “an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill
humors in the society.”305 Judicial review, a key tool of the courts, is particularly appropriate for “unblocking stoppages in the democratic process.”306 Seeing a situation that violated basic principles of representative
democracy307 and recognizing that rurally-dominated legislatures were
unlikely to address the problems of urban voters,308 Brennan opened the
door to using the Equal Protection Clause to address the ill humor of
malapportionment. At the same time, he increased the power of the federal
judiciary.309
In this active sense, Brennan’s instrumentalist philosophy helped to
shape Baker as a classic Footnote Four case.310 As Justice Harlan Stone
suggested in the famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products
Co.,311 the Court might have to apply “more exacting judicial scrutiny”
under the Fourteenth Amendment in cases in which “legislation . . . restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation.”312 Stone also suggested that a
more exacting judicial review might be appropriate in cases of “discrete
and insular minorities,” particularly when the political processes that normally protect such minorities are curtailed.313
Directly or indirectly, Baker was relevant to both of these Footnote
Four concerns. The lack of compliance with the apportionment requirement of the Tennessee Constitution severely restricted the way urban voters could change the composition of the Tennessee Legislature. Indeed,
the majority of the state population did not have recourse to bring about
more equitable representation.314 Brennan addressed this problem head on.
Also, although Brennan did not make an issue of race,315 since
Passive virtues proponent Alexander Bickel clerked for Frankfurter during the Supreme
Court’s 1952-53 term. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 78. Bickel apparently learned the passive virtues
well from his Holmesian mentor.
303.
Courts have “an obligation to decide in some cases.” Gunther, supra note 302, at 25.
304.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
305.
Id. at 494-95.
306.
ELY, supra note 280, at 117. An assumption of this approach is trust in the judiciary. Hasen,
supra note 241, at 1471.
307.
Charles, supra note 279, at 1132.
308.
POWE, supra note 6, at 202-03.
309.
MARION, supra note 41, at 27.
310.
POWE, supra note 6, at 214-15. See also Persily, Kousser & Egan, supra note 30, at 1307.
311.
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
312.
Id. at 152 n.4.
313.
Id. at 153 n.4.
314.
See Thomas I. Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 79 (1962).
315.
The issue of race came up briefly at oral argument in Baker. Robert M. Crea, Racial Discrimination and Baker v. Carr, 30 J. LEGIS. 289, 300-02 (2004).
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malapportioned states gave disproportionately greater representation to
rural areas that, at least at the ballot box, were generally white,316
malapportionment sometimes acted as a mask for state-sponsored racism
against black individuals in the urban areas.317 The disproportionately empowered rural white voters were often disinclined to work to remedy black
disenfranchisement.318 Thus, the normal political process was not able to
help such “discrete and insular minorities.”319 Brennan opened the door to
federal judicial action to address the problem of vote dilution in general,
and that included vote dilution of black Americans.320
Although Frankfurter was incensed with Brennan’s instrumentalism,
Brennan was not as active as he might have been. Rather than proceeding
on the merits, the Court remanded the Baker case to the district court for a
trial.321 Two years later, in New York Times v. Sullivan,322 another classic
instrumentalist opinion,323 Brennan not only established at the Supreme
Court level the legal principle of actual malice under the First Amendment
to protect the press that was covering the civil rights movement,324 but he
also applied that standard of actual malice to the facts at hand and came to
a pro-speaker, anti-public official conclusion on the merits.325 In contrast,
in Baker, Brennan exercised some caution so as not to lose an important
vote and jeopardize the future of federal judicial review of apportionment
issues. He deftly refrained from arriving at an ultimate conclusion, specif316.
Levinson, supra note 32, at 1296.
317.
Crea, supra note 315, at 289-90.
318.
Id. at 289.
319.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
320.
This statement does not imply that Brennan’s opinion in Baker was the key to resolving the
problem of black disenfranchisement in the United States in the 1960s. The key step forward in that
regard was the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which, in banning poll taxes, literacy tests, and other forms of
explicit racially based discrimination, led to a substantial increase in black enfranchisement. Deval L.
Patrick, The “Right that Is Preservative of All Rights”: Voting Rights Act Enforcement, in REASON
AND PASSION, supra note 13, at 223-24; Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment:
When Can Race Be Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 735, 758-59
(2002). Remedying diluted black voting rights would have been hard to do when blacks in the South
could not vote in the first place. Persily, Kousser & Egan, supra note 30, at 1301 n.4. Still, the spirit
of Brennan’s Baker opinion is consistent with the spirit of the Voting Rights Act.
321.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.
322.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
323.
See generally Carlo A. Pedrioli, A Key Influence on the Doctrine of Actual Malice: Justice
William Brennan’s Judicial Philosophy at Work in Changing the Law of Seditious Libel, 9 COMM. L.
& POL’Y 567 (2004). In addition to being described as “the most important libel opinion ever written,”
the Sullivan case has been labeled as potentially “the most important free-expression opinion in U.S.
jurisprudence.” W. WAT HOPKINS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 83 (1991).
In the years since 1964, the opinion has taken on “iconic stature.” KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I.
UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS 201
(2011).
324.
Even though the case dealt with libel, observers have viewed Sullivan as a civil rights case
because it helped civil rights advocates promote their message. HALL & UROFSKY, supra note 323, at
182.
325.
W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER TIMES V. SULLIVAN 116-17
(1989).
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ically to retain the vote of Stewart, who would support only jurisdiction
and not a decision on the merits.326 While somewhat restrained for an instrumentalist approach, this approach was not enough to console the distressed Holmesian Frankfurter.327
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has looked back at how the differing judicial philosophies
of Justice Brennan and Justice Frankfurter vied to shape the outcome of
the critical twentieth century Supreme Court case Baker v. Carr. To do
so, the Article provided an overview of four primary judicial philosophies,
including instrumentalism, Holmesianism, formalism, and natural law, and
offered background on the Baker case. The Article considered the various
philosophical ingredients at work in the opinions of Brennan and Frankfurter and made several observations regarding those judicial philosophies in
the two opinions.
As Charles Baker and the other plaintiffs saw the matter, at stake was
the value of each citizen’s vote based on where in the state he or she happened to live. In focusing on change and activity, Brennan’s opinion for
the majority, guided by instrumentalist principles, opened the door to a
future that looked very different from the present that the Court confronted. In focusing on tradition and passivity, Frankfurter’s dissent, guided by
Holmesian principles, would have retained the malapportionment of the
status quo, at best suggesting that Congress consider the problem. Despite
Frankfurter’s adamant protests,328 the Court and the country moved forward. By the 1962 election, only a few months after the Court’s Baker
decision, Georgia and Maryland each had reapportioned one state house,
and Tennessee and Alabama each had reapportioned both state houses.329
Other states soon would follow. If that progress had not happened, Chief
326.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 418.
327.
The Baker case apparently took a serious toll on Frankfurter. Fewer than two weeks after the
announcement of the decision, Frankfurter suffered a stroke in chambers, and then he suffered a more
serious stroke while in the hospital. POWE, supra note 6, at 205; CRAY, supra note 8, at 385; EISLER,
supra note 9, at 176. The second stroke caused Frankfurter to lose his ability to speak. ARTEMUS
WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 167 (2003). According to Solicitor General Archibald Cox, a former mentee of Frankfurter,
Frankfurter expressed to Cox that Baker had been responsible for the justice’s deteriorating health.
POWE, supra note 6, at 205. Unable to resume his duties as a justice, Frankfurter submitted his resignation to President Kennedy on August 28, 1962. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 427.
328.
Some commentary has suggested that Frankfurter’s warning that the Court avoid the “treacherous thicket” of reapportionment has “been consigned to the dustbin of history.” John Hart Ely,
Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the Board or Only When
Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 501-02 (2002). However,
other commentary sees Frankfurter as still relevant to theories of representative democracy and the
role of the courts in such a political system. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Back to the Beginning: An
Essay on the Court, the Law of Democracy, and Trust, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1053 (2008).
329.
BAKER, supra note 35, at 9.
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Justice Warren would have lacked the opportunity to claim credibly that
Baker was “the most important case” of his time on the Supreme Court.330

330.

WARREN, supra note 4, at 306.
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